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Both the Albanian and international experts agree that the territory controlled by the 
Provisional Government spread across approximately 4.000 km
2
 (approximately a sanjak) 
with a population of 250-300.000 people as of November-December 1912, out of which 30-
35.000 could be Turkish soldiers taking refuge in the region,
1
 practically in the Vlora–
Lushnja–Berat triangle. The other Albanian-inhabited areas were occupied by the Balkan 
allies, while this remaining territory was isolated by blockades and frontlines. Austro-
Hungarian sources suggest that it was only the presence of the Ottoman army that prevented 
the Balkan allies from invading this bit of land also. As the Ottoman troops represented the 
empire, the Vlora–Lushnja–Berat triangle is to be regarded as such an area where, in 
December 1912, co-existed the "new Albanian power" and the ruins of the "old Ottoman 
rule".
2
 To put it differently, both the Provisional Government and the remains of the already 
defeated Ottoman army, unable to perform frontline battle were in control of the area. This 
concept is further supported by the fact that in November-December 1912, the areas south of 
Shkumbi still had direct contact on land with the Ottoman army that was successfully 
defending Ioannina. And this army was still fighting for the Empire.
3
 
In the months following the declaration of independence, the Provisional Government 
exercised direct influence only in Vlora and its surrounding countryside.
4
 Gjirokastra, 
Tepelena and Përmet recognised Ismail Qemal Vlora as Prime Minister in the winter of 1912–
1913. Only after the spring of 1913, along with the slow retreat of the Serbian army and the 
Anatolian troops shipping home, could the other Albanian administrational districts recognise 
the rule of the Vlora Government.  
 
The independent Albania led by the Provisional Government faced grievous problems. The 
majority of the great houses declined submission to the new power; according to centuries-old 
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traditions their members formed parties and controlled their followers from the centre of their 
estates: the Toptanis from the Durrës–Tirana–Kruja triangle, the Vrionis from Fier and 
Muzeqe and the Vloras from Vlora. The remainder of the Albanian-controlled southern 
territories belonged to the Libohova and the Delvino families. Every such party could 
mobilize an army of one to three thousand people. The Muslim landlords of the area had no 
aversion to national sentiments, but many of them was still nursing hopes of attaining a well-
paid office in the Ottoman administration. In the winter of 1912–1913, their best interest was 
to promote the stabilization of the Albanian situation and the restoration of order. 
Interestingly, most of them expected not of Istambul but of the great powers with Adriatic 
interests to achieve these ends and to reorganise the political and economic life (construction 
of schools and establishment of banks etc.): mainly of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy that 
had already proved its capability in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
5
  
The local officials were mainly agha and bey families the majority of whom withdrew 
to their estates with their soldiers and there sought to wait and see how the events would 
eventually turn out. Most of them like the members of the intelligentsia pledged loyalty to one 
of the major houses and thus hoped for a better future.  
  By late autumn of 1912 the countryside population had been left without any higher 
authority to control them. Anarchy set in, and due to the war conditions and the lack of state 
control, waves of violence ensued. Robberies, murders and showdowns continued to go 
unpunished. The rivalry between interest groups increased which prevented these groups to 
pursue a policy along their joint interests. The only organisations that still worked were the 
troops gathering around the great houses and the bey families.  
 The deluge of Albanians from the Central Balkans fleeing from the Serbian army only 
worsened the situation. As to their numbers, only estimations are available, as part of them 
was always on the move because of the Serbian advance, and because after the Greek blocade 
had been lifted in early April, many Muslims must have shipped to Istambul so that they 
could settle down in Anatolia. The refugees set up their temporary shelters around major 
Central and Southern Albanian towns such as Durrës, Berat and Vlora. They numbered 
approximately 60.000 in the Durrës and Elbasan Sanjaks respectively, and about 5000 aroud 
Vlora.
6
 
 
The government was also hard put, because the Ottoman empire, and the army, the strongest 
local representative of the empire’s power, considered the declaration of independence as 
treason.  
 The Ottoman military leaders who were fighting in the West Balkan only received 
word with many days' delay of the events of 28th November, 1912. Pasha Esat Halasti 
assumedly ordered that Qemali be arrested and dragged to Ioannina. However, Myfit Bej 
Libohova, former member of the Albanian Parliament managed to convince him that with 
such a move he would only put in jeopardy the loyalty of his Albanian troops. After their 
discussion Pasha Halasti decided to order the officials who were loyal to the empire to 
cooperate with the Qemali administration.
7
 A few days later, on the 2nd of December it was 
already his autonomous decision to send a telegram to Vlora, ordering Qemali to organise the 
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independent Albania. The Pasha also indicated however, that any kind of independence 
inspired by the Monarchy or Italy, was out of the question.
8
 
 It was only on 3
rd
 December that the Grand Vizier received detailed information about 
the 28
th
 November Vlora events from the father of independence. Qemali announced that he 
and the delegates of the Albanian nation formed the Provisional Government, because, as he 
pointed out, the empire could no longer defend the Albanian-inhabited territories against the 
external adversaries.
9
 
 Grand Vizier Kâmil's10 response arrived on 9th December. Hardly could Kâmil Pasha 
conceal his bafflement, as he thought that the declaration of independence had been no less 
than an uprising against the empire. He deemed the new arrangement rather unfortunate, as it 
meant that there were no longer such power that could prevent the partition of Albania 
between the Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. Kâmil Pasha attempted to influence the 
Provisional Government by claiming, that the Ministers' Council of the Young Turk 
Government resolved on 23
th
 October to give complete autonomy to Albania under the 
leadership of an Ottoman prince, and the relating decree was already being prepared.
11
 He 
warned Qemali that the events might turn out for him much as they previously did for the 
Crimean Khan, who declared independence but still lost his power to Russia.
12
 Qemali 
thanked the Vizier for the offer, but found it belated, as independence had been declared 
which entitled the London Conference of Ambassadors to determine the future of the 
country.
13
  
Two weeks after the receipt of the Grand Vizier's letter 200 Turkish riders set out for 
Vlora on unknown initiative. Qemali sent 50 soldiers to hold them at the Linec Pass,
14
 but an 
armed conflict was in the interest of neither of the parties.
15
 Qemali sent another letter in 
Turkish to the Grands Vizier on 18
th
 December, 1912. The letter was written in a conciliatory 
tone and emphasised the motifs behind the declaration of independence: the Albanians wished 
to avoid foreign control and the partition of their fatherland. Qemali argued, that it was also in 
Istambul's best interest to support a friendly Albania that could act as a balancing power 
among the hostile states of the peninsula, an idea which was also promoted by the great 
powers' policy.
16
 Another argument to support the foundation of the new state was the 
nationality principle which was promoted by the Balkan allies and was also accepted by the 
great powers. Qemali said, it would be a shame not to capitalise on these benefits, and he 
requested [!] the Grand Vizier to grant him the freedom necessary to establish a government 
that might satisfy both states.
17
 There is no knowing if this letter was ever answered. After 
this, however, the Ottoman authorities also blocked the telegram and mail traffic in Vlora, and 
thus contributed to the isolation of Qemali and the town.
18
  
 
 
The Ottoman army in Central and Southern Albania 
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In November-December 1912, three Ottoman army groups and a few minor independent  
corps were present in Central and Southern Albania. Around Ioannina, the Albanian Esat 
Halasti Pasha and his brother, Vehib Halasti Pasha led an army of 30-40.000 men (out of 
which, according to Myfit Libohova the Albanian soldiers could number around 12.000
19
), 
while the 5
th
 army group and the remains of the Vardar army controled the territory between 
the Shkumbi river and Berat.
20
 It was the latter two that posed a real threat to the Vlora 
government, as the Halasti brothers were unable to send considerable reinforcements if they 
were to hold Ioannina.  
 The 5
th
 army group under the command of Kara Said withdrew from Kumanovo to the 
region of Berat. Only 12.000 people were still alive of the army group out of which 
approximately 4.000 were stationed around the town. These troops were disciplined and 
maintained good relationship with the local population as well. They were no longer fit for 
front battle: in early January, 1913 one battalion was for example complemented with 1.000 
local insurgents and a machine gun, and was ordered to Himara. One day later the battalion 
turned insubordinate and turned back. Kara Said established a more or less operating military 
administration, which also tolerated the presence of the Provisional Government 
representatives on the territories it controlled. It was this Ottoman army that prevented the 
Serbian troops from crossing the Shkumbi river. Due to the desertion of the Albanians, only 
6.000 Turkish troops had remained of the army group by January 1913 (the Albanians 
escaped home to their fatherland to fight).
21
  
It was 2.000 demoralised, unkempt and exhausted Anatolian soldiers that had 
withdrawn to the Fier area. They were lethargic with the only aim to reach home. They sold 
all the weapons and ammunitions they had left to the local Albanians for money and food. 
Their officers made no attempt to restore order and discipline.  
A sovereign division of the Vardar army fled to Albania under the leadership of Cavid 
Pasha, who originally defended the sanjak of Novi Pazar. The Serbian army was chasing him 
when reached the Adriatic at Durrës. Cavid Pasha had approximately 5.000 men left. They set 
up camp in the Vlora region and until May 1913, when the troops were finally shipped home, 
they had posed a constant threat for the Provisional Government.
22
  
 To the south of them in Delvino there were 4-5 battalions stationed, comprising partly 
Albanians under the leadership of Mehmet Ali Delvino Pasha. The Albanian landowner 
marched his troops from Bitola to his homeland, where he introduced military administration. 
In early December at Saranda about 500-1.000 underequipped Greek soldiers disembarked 
who, on their way to Delvino, unsuspectingly walked into the imperial army armed with a 
machine gun and four quickfiring mountain guns. Mehmet Ali Pasha pushed them into the sea 
and thus he prevented for months the Greek occupation of this part of South-Albania. The 
Pasha never supported Qemali's policy but neither did he threaten him with attack. With his 
forces he covered Esat Halasti from the coast, kept the çamër territories under surveillance, 
and successfully protected his family estates as well.  
 In early December another 12.000 demoralised soldiers were stationed around 
Leskovik under the leadership of the Turkish Halil bey.
23
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The hostile attitude of the Ioannina Ottoman army against Qemali was due not only to the 
proclamation of independence, but also to the fact that the head of the Provisional 
Government sent messages to the Albanian soldiers in the army urging them to desert. On the 
one hand, Qemali saw the imperial army as a threat, and therefore tried to weaken it by all 
means. On the other hand, he visioned peaceful relations with the Balkan states – and so, in 
the name of the independent Albania, he objected to all armed conflict whatsoever. Thirdly, 
he firmly believed that when setting the final borders, the great powers would not take into 
consideration where the troops of the Balkan allies are being stationed, that is, he found it 
senseless for the Albanian soldiers to shed their blood in the Ottoman army.
24
  
The Premier's messages made thousands of Albanians desert from the Ottoman forces 
along with their officers, taking their weapons and ammunition. Although after 20
th
 December 
the Provisional Government sent no more such messages, Qemali's propaganda still 
demoralised the remaining Albanian troops of the Ottoman army in the long run.  
As to the desertion the Ottoman field officers were helpless: they applied martial law 
and amnesty but to no avail.
25
 Only after Musa Hamit Demi's visit were the relationship 
between Qemali and the Ottoman military leaders settled: there were no more messages 
urging the Albanians to desert, and the Ottoman leaders took cognizance of the Provisional 
Government (see later). The Provisional Government had not much business to do with the 
Ioannina high command. All that passed between was that from early 1913 a few members of 
the Provisional Government sent a number of telegrams to the Ioannina Ottoman forces in 
connection with Çamëria among other things, in which they ordered the forces led by Halasti 
to look after the general defense of the southern territories.
26
 Qemali, however, had no mind 
to provide active support for the Ottoman forces to this end. 
Owing to Qemali's propaganda approximately 3-4.000 Albanian soldiers deserted from 
Berat until March 1913. In Ioannina only 2 of the original 12 Albanian redif battalions held 
their ground, the rest fled for home. The majority of the Albanian regulars of the nizam-units 
however, kept their position and continued to fight until the ceasefire. It is important to note 
about those who deserted from Ioannina, that most of them went to Çamëria to fight against 
the Greek attackers in their fatherland while others gathered around Gjirokastra and Delvino 
and returned under the leadership of Esat Halasti.
27
 
 
The Ottoman troops stationed in Middle Albania posed much more significant threat for the 
Vlora government in the long run than Esat Halasti Pasha, as these troops indeed had the 
opportunity to forcefully abolish the Provisional Government which, from an imperial point 
of view, was simply considered rebellious. The Turkish commanders of Berat had a basically 
hostile attitude towards Qemali's policy, but at the same time they were very much aware of 
their real situation: their troops were unfit for battle and besides, they had to pull through in 
Albanian-inhabited territories. Therefore, in order to survive the war, they did not risk an 
armed conflict.
28
 
Virtually all Albanian troops deserted from Berat to Qemali's summons. Those few 
who remained, with some officers among their numbers pledged loyalty to Qemali in a letter 
and undertook to provide information for the government in Vlora.
29
 The Premier strove to 
keep the remaining Turkish military away from the port and its vicinity and tried to encumber 
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their efforts to get supplies. He also attempted to persuade the high commanders in Berat to 
capitulate and lay down their arms. Furthermore, he sent telegrams to the governments of the 
Adriatic great powers in which he urged that those troops be shipped home to Anatolia.
30
 
 
 
The Provisional Government and the Armies of the Balkan Allies 
 
Although the Provisional Government did not participate directly in the fight against the 
Greek, according to the Albanian historiography, between December 1912 and March 1913 
the government was mostly preoccupied with how the Greek could be driven out from the 
country.
31
  
During this period a minor Greek force (1-3.000 soldiers) stationed in Himara and 
posed a constant threat to the city of Vlora.
32
 To the south, fights continued in Labëria and 
Çamëria mainly along the road leading from Ioannina to Vlora and along the coastline. The 
Greek free corps here, led by trained officers and equipped with machine guns and cannons, 
fought against irregular Albanian insurgents. Resistance proved to be successful until the fall 
of Ioannina, as the siege prevented the Greek royal army from directly supporting Epirotean 
and Cretean Greek bands. In mid-December Eqrem Bej Vlora, whom Qemali consequently 
denied supplies and other support, travelled to the spot to support the Albanian free corps (the 
Premier declared on more than one occasion that the independent Albania wishes to live in 
peace with her neighbours). The position of the Greek troops was further weakened when 
thousands of armed Albanian soldiers appeared between Delvino and Prevesa (cca. 6.000). It 
is almost certain that they deserted from Ioannina in order to fight here.
33
 
 It was not a real concern for Vlora living under the maritime blockade that the Greek 
may attempt to land in the port city. The sea was controled by old wooden ships with a few 
cannons aboard.
34
 The population only turned alarmed around 21
st
 December 1912, when one 
of these small ships launched a few bombs on the city.
35
 It remains unknown whether the 
action was related to the London events of 17
th
 December; or the captain may only have put 
the defense of the city to the test. Be that as it may, after the bombardment Eqrem Vlora and 
hundreds of his soldiers hurried to the coast to prevent a possible landing. Qemali sent Sami 
Bej Vrioni to the port to find out the cause of the bombardment.
36
 Understanding that the 
Premier is ready to negotiate, a few days later the Greeks commanded three battleship in the 
Bay of Vlora. The captain of the flagship invited Qemali aboard. He, however, refused to 
accept the invitation, saying he only wishes to negotiate with the great powers.
37
  
 The Greek blockade became efficient following the fall of Ioannina.
38
 The control of 
the sea was expanded as far as Durrës, because on the Adriatic sea unexpectedly turned up 
one of the strongest Ottomon cruisers, the Hamidie, and the Greeks worried that arms and 
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ammunition might be loaded ashore from her.
39
 Athens lifted the blockade on 14
th
 April, 
1913. after the first agreements on the shipping home of the Anatolian troops had been 
concluded. Until the end of March, the Greek warships successfully prevented Qemali from 
travelling to London and participating in the conference of ambassadors. 
 
The Serbian army that invaded Middle-Albania to the Shkumbi had no indirect connection 
with the Vlora government. They occupied the long sought after marine port and then their 
attention shifted to the siege of Shkodra and the invaded territories of the Middle-Balkans. In 
South Albania there was no threat of a Serbian-Albanian clash.
40
  
 The first semi-official contact between Qemali and the Serbians took place in February 
1913. The Premier could less and less tolerate his being locked up in Vlora and the negative 
attitude of the Adriatic powers as to his European travel. He started negotiations with the 
Serbian authorities so that these would not keep him from traveling.
41
 The Beograd 
government took advantage of Qemali's approaching them and started a new Albanian policy. 
Živojin Balugčić, the former Serbian consul in Salonica who had decades of experience about 
the Albanians, was sent to Durrës, and colonel Paunović was appointed the military leader of 
the port city. The arrival of the Serbian diplomat and the new commander mitigated the 
tension between the Albanians and Serbians in Middle Albania as both of them sought to 
maintain good relationship with the Muslim landowner and bey families.
42
 Contact was made 
through Hamdi Bej Toptani from Durrës. His task was to organise a secret meeting 
somewhere around the Shkumbi river between Balugčić and Qemali. Eventually the meeting 
failed to take place, as the Premier only wanted to speak about his traveling to Italy, while the 
Serbian diplomat wanted to win the Vlora government over for the ideas of his own 
government.
43
 
 The Beograd government sent not only Serbian diplomats to Middle Albania but also 
Macedonian Albanians, such as Fehim Bej Zavalani, the leader of the Bitola Albanian Club, 
who was also a follower of the youngturk ideology.
44
 To put it differently: the Serbs managed 
to gain for their ideas the support of a Muslim who had acquired quite a name for himself in 
the national movement. Until 1913, the bey held negotiations with Serbian government 
authorities on a number of occasions and supposedly he also drew a monthly allowance from 
Beograd.
45
 Fehim Zavalani, along with other Albanians from Bitola, arrived in Durrës at the 
end of February, 1913, and there joined Hamdi Toptani.  
 The task of Zavalani and Balugčić was to gain Qemali's support for a temporary 
Serbian occupation of smaller Albanian territories (as for example in the case of Berat 
sanjak), or possibly for a Serbian-Albanian personal union or for the idea of an independent 
Albania under Serbian supremacy. In return they promised to promote the Premier's travel in 
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Europe.
46
 During the negotiations the bey of Bitola tried to act as a personal mediator between 
Qemali and the Beograd authorities.
47
  
 The head of the Provisional Government refused to participate in any negotiations that 
could possibly affect the future of Albania. He still expected the great powers to decide about 
the fate of his country and never relinquished his idea to personally take part in the great 
powers' negotiations leading his own delegation. For Qemali, the negotiations between 
Albania and Serbia finally became irrelevant when the Mekong arrived in Vlora on 28
th
 
March, 1913 (see later).  
 
 
The Qemali government aspirations in domestic policy 
 
In the months following the proclamation of independence, the Provisional Government 
started to operate in almost impossible conditions: due to the Greek maritime blockade and 
the fact that the telegram cable connecting Vlora with Bari had been cut off, the town became 
totally isolated.
48
 The central bureaucratic system and the administration in general collapsed, 
and in the countryside total chaos ensued. What is more, the new state law situation created 
new problems.
49
 
 Until the great powers in London decided on a finalised organisational framework, the 
government aimed to build out a temporary public administration. The first attempt at this was 
made in the aforementioned Vlora–Lushnja–Berat triangle.50 The objective was not merely to 
restore order and collect taxes, but the government also wanted to demonstrate the self-
organising and self-administering skills of the Albanians.  
 In the country the reorganisation of the administration could only be attempted at such 
places where no imperial or other invasion forces were stationed. Such places were growing 
in number (until April 1913 especially in the former Berat, Elbasan and Durrës sanjaks).51 
Apart from some territorial reorganisation, the administration of the Provisional Government 
retained the Ottoman system of sanjaks and kazas. Basically, a part of the former officials 
everywhere tried to restore office routine on their own. Qemali either ratified the appointment 
of the former functionaries or later approved certain changes, or from his Vlora office he 
appointed officials from the local aristocrats.
52
 He could provide no more support. Thus in 
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Vlora and its vicinity the Provisional Government kept operating the former administrative 
system.
53
  
 Interestingly enough, Durrës established its own administrative system in December 
led by Hamdi Bej Toptani right after the Serbian invasion. The locals already in the first days 
of occupation informed the Serbian military authorities that they came under the legislation of 
the Provisional Government and not that of the Ottoman Empire. It is however important to 
note, that the town only namely acknowledged the authority of the Provisional Government; 
Ismail Qemal Vlora gained no influence whatsoever over the port town.
54
 During the winter 
the inhabitants laid the foundations of a municipal system which was assigned to take over the 
control of the town and its vicinity following a possible Serbian withdrawal. The civilian-
administrative, juridical and police bodies organised by Hamdi Bej Toptani never planned to 
further acknowledge the authority of the Vlora Government after the withdrawal of the 
invasion forces.
55
 
  The Provisional Government had no sufficient domestic income to operate the 
administration. On the land, the imperial army used up all available resources, while the 
Greek blockade prevented the port from profiting from the tariffs. Formerly the latter had 
been the most important income for the town of Vlora: it amounted  to a monthly 120-140.000 
French francs.
56
  
 The government basically could rely on two domestic income source: the saltworks in 
the port and the taxes collected in and around Vlora. The former yielded nicely in peacetime, 
the equipment and the buildings alone were worth as much as 5.000 Turkish liras. Qemali 
placed one of his confidants in charge of the works, so he could directly obtain the profit.
57
 
Indirect tax collection was executed in accordance with the tax obligations prior to 28
th
 
November, however, this time the amount was used not by the imperial bureaucracy but by 
the Provisional Government. While the government held office, the population never failed to 
pay the due taxes. 
 
Ismail Qemali founded his actions on the hope that the fate of Albania will be decided by the 
great powers. It was they whom he expected to mark the final borders of his country and to 
stop the Serbian and Greek armies, and so he considered any kind of struggle as unnecessary 
and aimless. Basically this was the reason why he kept demoralising the Albanian soldiers 
fighting around Ioannina during the winter of 1912-1913.
58
  
 Yet he needed his own armed forces to protect his government, maintain order and 
defend against possible Albanian rivals and against Ottoman, Serbian or Greek attacks.
59
 The 
first such remarkable force at his disposal comprised the warriors of two Kosovarian 
warlords, Isa Boletini
60
 and Riza Bej Gjakova. These fighters were well-armed and had 
gained considerable battle experience while fighting against the Turkish and Serbian regular 
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forces. They were also disciplined, "psychologically strong" and according to the 
contemporary Austrian spy, First Lieutenant Johann Hofmann, they were also known for their 
self-confidence and courage.  Both Boletini and Riza Bey assured that they were never 
wanting in discipline: they kept drilling their soldiers on the fields around Vlora. The only 
problem with these warlords was that there was only one thing that made them loyal to the 
government: they expected it to liberate Kosovo vilaet. The two leaders behaved like two 
medieval knights: due to their authority they possessed the right to do whatever they pleased 
and nobody dared to order them around. Hierarchically speaking they were on a level with the 
government rather than under it. It is true however, that they never took advantage of their 
position and indeed stood ready to protect the Provisional Government. 
 Qemali already started to organise his own armed force in December 1912. Soldiers 
could be recruited from three places basically: from the former policing crew of the empire 
(eg. gendarmerie), from the Albanian soldiers who had deserted from the Ottoman army and 
from the volunteering insurgents.
61
 The Premier also called to armes men from the colonies, 
but to no real avail.
62
 
 In December 1912 Ismail Qemal Vlora originally meant to set up an army of 3.000 
comprising deserting soldiers and officers whom he expected to come over to the Vlora 
government along with their equipment taken from the imperial army. He established a secret 
committee with the assignment to enlist the soldiers and win them for the cause of the 
independent Albania. To set up the army he also requested the Adriatic powers to provide a 
support of 100-200.000 Krones. At that time, however, Vienna and Rome did not support the 
idea of an independent Albanian army.
63
 
 Finally he managed to enlist around 100 people with some Anatolian Turkish 
gendarmes serving in Albania among their number as well. As the deserting soldiers were 
well equipped with weapons and ammunition, and the army warehouses had been raided 
earlier, most of those enlisted entered service carrying their own weapons. Everybody had a 
rifle, handgun and bandoliers with 100-200 pockets for ammunition.  
The scope of authority for the gendarmerie operations ranged as far as Lushnja, Berat 
and Gjirokastra (i.e. as far as the Albanian banner represented the Provisional Government), 
but first of all they were stationed on the southern roads leading to Ioannina in posts set up 
every 10 kilometres. 20-50 of the gendarmes kept guard on the Llogara pass so that they could 
observe the Greeks landed in Himara. The gendarmes were responsible for maintaining order, 
patrolling and, in principle, apprehending deserters, but due to the free corps ravaging the 
region they hardly ever left their blockhouses. According to contemporary military 
intelligence agent Bruno Thomas, they were fit to perform primarily duties of reconnoissance 
and guerilla warfare. 
 Qemali's elder son, Edhem Bej Vlora, inexpert in military matters, became in charge 
of the gendarmarie of the Provisional Government, but occasionally the Premier himself acted 
as their commander. Minister of war, Mehmet Dërralla64 had no influence whatsoever over 
the corps.  
Besides the gendarmarie bigger towns also retained their police force of a few dozen 
people. These operated in accordance with the old regulation and were led by the local kadis. 
In Vlora, Minister of justice Poga also issued a few orders to the police.  
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Ismail Qemali's greatest Albanian rival in South-Albania was undoubtedly Eqrem Bej Vlora
65
 
and his party at that time. While the young bey accepted his uncle's position and the situation 
in aftermath of the proclamation of independence, he tried to limit his opponent's possibilities 
to his best abilities. Eqrem did not strive to secure the power for himself, partly because he 
believed that his uncle would be able to overcome his personal feelings, partly because he was 
well aware that due to his strong sympathy with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy he would 
fail to secure the necessary support. In the contemporary context his youth was also regarded 
as a disadvantage (he was 27 years of age at the time).
66
 
 Eqrem Vlora however found political allies, namely Vice Premier Nikollë Kaçorri67 
and Murat Bej Toptani
68
. Although his contemporaries voiced several reasons for their 
opposing Qemali, the primary pretext for the confrontation was that Qemali had failed to 
organise the armed resistance against the armies of the Balkan states and had hindered those 
wishing to fight, not to mention his letters in which he had urged the Albanian soldiers of 
Ioannina and Berat to desert. His rivals made Qemali responsible for the Greek occupation of 
South-Albania. The confrontation was mainly expressed verbally, through background 
intrigues. Unlike Eqrem Vlora, Myfit Bej Libohova
69
 supported Qemali and he also 
emphasised that offering resistance would have been utterly senseless.
70
   
 The Muslim Tosk aristocrats who participated in the defense of Ioannina also held 
Qemali accountable for the lack of armed resistance as in Çamëria and around Ioannina 
during the winter of 1912-1913 intense clashes continued between the Albanians and the 
regular and irregular Greek forces. The Muslim aristocrats and the fighting Albanian soldiers 
joined forces to organise defense. They were very much aware of the fact that they would lose 
to Greece those kazas and sanjaks where the Albanians were in minority compared with the 
Greek populace, but they also regarded Ioannina as the natural capital of South-Albania which 
was to be defended at all cost - either for the Empire or for an independent Albania.
71
 The 
hostility Qemali and the Provisional Government displayed deeply embittered them, but they 
also resented the inhabitants of the northern, Catholic, tribal territories for not offering 
resistance. The Albanian free corps were on their own, the Provisional Government denied 
them any direct support between 28
th
 November and 15
th
-18
th
 December, which further 
fuelled the rumour that the Premier obeys Athens only, and means for Epirus and Himara to 
be parts of Greece.  
The Tosks were generally disappointed in the Adriatic powers, with special regard to 
the Monarchy as they passively witnessed the events of the Balkan war. Although the various 
South-Albanian aristocratic groups sent several letters and telegrams to Rome and Vienna (the 
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nobles of Çamëria even requested Austria to grant them access into the monarchy), they 
always received a negative or an evasive answer.
72
 
 The Tosk aristocrats who had come from Ioannina, Gjirokastra and Serfice sanjaks and 
lived in Ioannina during the siege, decided in early December that they would personally call 
Ismail Qemali to account for his telegrams and messages in which he had urged the soldiers to 
desert. They selected Musa Hamit Demi
73
 and sent him to Vlora to demand answers from the 
Premier. It was also one of Demi's task to persuade the Provisional Government about the 
necessity of the armed resistance. After their meeting Qemali altered his policy and sent no 
more such messages. Demi could also convince the Premier that the Ottoman corps in 
Ioannina under the leadership of Esat Pasha Halasti actually defended the potential southern 
borders of Albania and they prevented the Greek army from invading the remaining Albanian 
territories, therefore dividing the defense would not prove to be a good idea. At the same time 
Qemali, in the name of the Provisional Government, refused to launch a joint Turkish-
Albanian action against the Greek.
74
 
On 20
th
 December, 1912, Ismail Qemal Vlora sent a congratulating telegram to the 
Ottoman high command in Ioannina for their victory over the Greek.
75
 Musa Hamit Demi, 
after spending a week in Vlora, also returned to Ioannina. He was accompanied by one of the 
ministers, Mithat Bej Frashëri whose was entrusted with the task of heartening the soldiers to 
keep on fighting
76. During Frashëri's stay in Ioannina the Albanians of the town even toyed 
with the idea of overthrowing Qemali and putting a new Premier in power. This however 
never happened, as the local Austro-Hungarian consul warned the conspirators against an 
open Albanian-Albanian clash and its possibly dire consequences.
77
  
 
From the perspective of domestic policy, the government proved unsuccessful between 
December 1912 and March 1913: it failed to create an operating administration and to 
maintain order. Practically it operated as a city administration, while it was the one and only 
organisation that aspired to legitimately represent the interests of Albania outside the country. 
The government had not much influence in the countryside either: unoccupied territories 
remained under the control of the leaders of the great houses or under that of the Ottoman 
troops.  
When assessing the performance of the government, one must not forget however, that 
under such circumstances even the most prepared body of experts would have been bound to 
fail. Foreign governments considered the Qemali administration as illegitimate and thus the 
Provisional Government so much depended on the decisions taken at the London conference 
and on the daily events of the Balkan that it was impossible for it to start any significant 
domestic reforms from the beginning. The only task the government could perform was to 
represent internationally and, to a smaller extent, domestically that Albania has a 
government.
78
  
 
 
The foreign policy of the Provisional Government 
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The Government, isolated in Vlora, maintained "proper" relations with the Adriatic great 
powers only, through their local consulates. Though neither Vienna nor Rome supported 
overtly the Albanian government, for their own interests they maintained their diplomatic 
presence in Vlora which greatly contributed to the stabilization of the region.
79
 Their 
influence was based on the Albanian policy they pursued in former decades and on the fact 
that it was these consulates through which any information from the outside world could 
reach the port town. Their prestige was further increased by the Albanian expectations, as 
both the Provisional Government and the population expected these two great powers to drive 
out the invading Serbian, Greek etc troops. It is important to note however, that the maritime 
blockade also hindered these two consulates, as they could only sent sporadic reports to their 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, and thus neither the Ballhausplatz nor the Consulta had exact 
information as to the South-Albanian situation.
80
  
 It was this lack of information and the communicational difficulties that necessitated 
that the two Adriatic powers dispatch spies and agents into Albania. While the Greek 
blockade never ceased to control the shore, with proper determination both the Italian and the 
Austro-Hungarian warships could anchor along the coast. As to the Italian agents, no archive 
sources have so far been published. It is known however, that Conrad, Chief of General Staff 
of the Monarchy dispatched at least seven intelligence officers to Albania whose tasks he 
liaised with the joint Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These agenst were required not only to 
collect information but also to promote the (military) interests of their home countries. To be 
more exact, they had to plan a possible contraband of arms, organise Austro-Hungarian 
friendly Albanians etc, and Qemali often protested against the latter activities.
81
   
 The most important link between the Adriatic powers and the Provisional Government 
was undoubtedly the fact that Vienna and Rome provided the operating funds necessary for 
the Qemali government. In the first half of December 1912, Qemali applied to the great 
powers for a contribution of 100-200.000 Krones to support the Albanian national 
aspirations.
82
 Both ministries of foreign affairs were willing to provide the loan, but they also 
expressed their desire to control how this sum was being used.
83
 So far no information has 
surfaced in the Vienna archive sources as to whether the Monarchy provided any funds for 
Albanian governmental purposes between December 1912 and March 1913, and if so, how 
much. What is known is that the Qemali family, in order to maintain power, drew regular 
allowances from Vienna (for example in March, 1913 they received 5.000 francs) and 
presumably from Rome as well. It is also a fact, that the Albanian Premier, during his travels 
in Europe, received 20.000 francs in the capitals of both great powers for governmental 
purposes, which amount he spent in total during the travels.
84
  
 Significantly higher amounts were spent supporting the refugees in the Albanian 
territories controlled by the Provisional Government.
85
 Vienna and Rome liaised the 
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organisation of the humanitarian aid on equal terms down to the most meticulous detail: the 
assigned diplomatic offices assessed the needs in joint reports, requested financial support and 
foodstuff together, received aid of equal amount and value and distributed it together 
according to jointly received orders. Although the foreing armies present and the poor 
infrastructure posed significant difficulties, the Austro-Hungarian and Italian consuls 
conscientiously traveled the region and strove to compile exact and detailed lists, statistics 
and assessments of the circumstances, conditions and needs.
86
 To a lesser extent, help was 
needed by those hundreds who wanted to ship to Anatolia from the Albanian harbours
87
, and 
to a greater extent by those fleeing to Middle-Albania from Macedonia and Kosovo.  
 In March, 1913, following a brief liaising, the Ballhausplatz and the Consulta agreed 
to allocate a daily amount of 500 Krones to the refugees in and around Vlora as long as the 
Greek blockade would last. The aid was not merely of financial nature, but also meant 
shipping corn, wheat, flour, salt, beans etc. to Albania.
88
 However, the humanitarian support 
continued after the Greeks lifted the blockade on 14
th
 April: both parties offered a further 
amount of 20-20.000 francs. The distribution was assigned to a committee comprising 
employees of the Italian and Austro-Hungarian consulates and officials of the Provisional 
Government. This aid was also meant for the refugees around Berat.
89
 At the end of April an 
Italian and an Austro-Hungarian warship set out for Vlora, with 20-20.000 francs worth of 
medical equipment (medical instruments, medicine, tents, blankets), foodstuff and ready 
money aboard.
90
 The Vlora government was not the only beneficiary of this shipment: the 
Ottoman military commands of Fier and Berat also received their share, thus the aid reached 
the remaining Ottoman troops as well.
91
  
 
The conditions in Vlora proved to be almost unbearable for Ismail Qemal Vlora. He had 
served for decades as an Ottoman chief official, where he had got used to being respected and 
to a certain due distance between himself and the ordinary people. In the house of Xhemal 
Vlora however, anybody could walk up to him and present the most insignificant problems. 
Such were the "physical" circumstances under which the Premier was struggling to influence 
the policy-making of the great powers.
92
  
 The most important objective for his government was to properly represent the 
Albanians before the great powers and the other Balkan states. Accordingly, Qemali and a 
few other members of his administration started planning a European tour as early as 
December, 1912. The Premier originally intended to visit the capitals of the great powers with 
a delegation of 3-8 members carefully selected on the basis of religious equality, and wanted 
to finish his tour in London so that he could officially represent Albania at the Re-Union 
negotiations where the final decisions were taken.
93
 Qemali would have welcomed 
representatives of all Albanian-inhabited regions, like Hasan Bej Prishtina and Nexhip Draga 
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as representatives of the Albanians of the Middle-Balkans.
94
 Another objective of the tour was 
to secure credits for the new state. 
 In principle, Vienna and Rome never opposed to an Albanian delegation taking a 
European tour (via their consulates in Vlora they even assured Qemali that they would 
provide all necessary means, such as interpreters, etc.), but both great powers insisted that the 
Premier must not be among the members of the delegation.
95
 Accordingly, Italian consul de 
Facendis and Austro-Hungarian consul Lejhanec were ordered to retain Qemali in Vlora by 
all means and convince him that he was far more needed in Albania than in London.
96
 The 
experts of both great powers were absolutely positive that in the event of the Premier's 
leaving, Albania would surely lose any remaining illusion of order.  
 However, Qemali kept insisting (as Austro-Hungarian sources suggest "rather 
stubbornly") all along on his leading the delegation. He argued that he was the only Albanian 
who had diplomatic relations and adequate experience, what is more, his leadership would 
greatly stabilise his government and consolidate the situation in Albania. He even tried to win 
the support of the Adriatic powers by delegating members who expressly had a friendly 
disposition towards Italy and Austro-Hungary – but to no avail.97  
 In February-March, 1913, Qemali once again made efforts to travel Europe. As the 
great powers still declined to provide any support, Qemali started negotiations with the Greek 
commanders in charge of the blockade at Vlora and with Balugčić, Serbian diplomat who had 
arrived in Durrës and asked them for support. In return, he offered certain concessions.98 
These offers, however, only served to buy Qemali time: he only made them to gain support 
for leaving the country, as he himself expected answers to all questions from the London 
conference. It is proven by the fact, that once the Mekong appeared, Qemali immediately 
suspended all negotiations with the Balkan allies.  
The yacht of Ferdinand François Bourbon-Orleans99, Prince of Montpensier and 
descendant of Skanderbeg broke through the blockade and made a surprise appearance in the 
port town. In early March, the prince and his henchman, Albert Ghica
100
 were still staying in 
Trieste and there caused quite a stir among the Viennese and Roman diplomats when they 
announced the prince's claim to the Albanian throne. After his visit to Trieste Montpensier 
anchored in various Italian ports and planned to contraband a shipment of arms into Vlora and 
in return to request the Provisional Government to proclaim him the monarch of Albania; thus 
he wished to present a fait accompli to the European great powers.
101
 However, the regular 
and aggressive control and threatening harassment of the Italian civil and military authorities 
and the increased presence of imperial and royal warships on the Adriatic Sea made him 
reconsider and abandon the idea.
102
 On 27
th
 March Montpensier's yacht appeared along the 
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shore of Corfu, and the next day the ship - with the prince standing aboard clad in British 
navy officer uniform - broke through the blockade and cast anchor in Vlora.
103
  
On his arrival the French prince and his yacht with the Albanian flag on the mast were 
cheered upon by the crowd gathering in the port. After disembarking he donated 1000 francs 
to the poor and distributed hundreds of postcards depicting him and fliers with Albanian 
captions about him. He behaved as a future monarch albeit he never said if it was the antant or 
the Balkan allies or a third party that supported his ambitions. In Montpensier's escort, besides 
Albert Ghica, there were a few Albanian patriots as well, among other Mark Kakarriqi (a 
Catholic from Shkodra) and Peter Kodjamani (an Orthodox from Berat).  
Qemali and Montpensier contacted each other without hesitation. Although the Italian 
and the Austro-Hungarian consuls warned the prince that the two Adriatic powers did not 
regard favourably Qemali's trip to Europe, Montpensier still started negotiations with the 
Premier. Although he was not proclaimed monarch, he received certain promises, that the 
Provisional Government would favour him as a likely candidate in London.
104
 The 
negotiations soon drew to an end: the prince agreed to transport the delegation to Italy. The 
three most important members of the committee were Qemali (the politician), Luigj 
Gurakuqi
105
 (the intellectual) and Boletini (the soldier), but Qemali’s two sons (Edhem and 
Qazim) and Boletini’s sons (7 altogether) were also aboard. The Premier did not let anybody 
have their say when selecting the members of the delegation: only his henchmen could 
participate. Before his departure he issued orders to remove from the government all those in 
his opposition whom he perceived as a potential threat: Kaçorri, Mithat Frashëri and Abdi Bej 
Toptani.
106
 The delegation set out with 900 Turkish lira for travel expenses.  
 They arrived in Brindisi on 30
th
 March, whence Ismail Qemali immediately traveled to 
Rome, while his companions went to Bari.
107
 The Premier negotiated with San Giuliano, the 
Italian minister of foreign affairs and two days later with Kajetán Mérey, Austro-Hungarian 
ambassador in Rome. Both diplomats received Qemali with mistrust and endeavoured to 
convince him to return home as soon as possible.
108
 Neither party offered any promises or 
encouragement. 
 The delegation arrived in Vienna on 10
th
 April. Here the representatives of 
Ballhausplatz and also the heir presumptive Franz Ferdinand contacted them, the latter 
attempting to get them to acknowledge Prince Urach's claim to the throne. In Vienna 
negotiations took place not only with the Albanian Premier: the general staff and the joint 
minister of war made enquiries with Boletini about the military situation and a possible 
cooperation.
109
  
The negotiations in Rome and Vienna clearly indicate that what worried the Adriatic 
allies was that Qemali's delegation might support the claims of Montpensier while the 
Ballhausplatz and the Consulta took all possible efforts to eliminate those claims. Qemali 
however took interest primarily in the future borders of Albania and in acquiring as much 
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information as possible.
110
 It was presumably during these negotiations that the head of the 
Provisional Government developed the principles he wished to represent in London: 1. 
Albania must utterly break away from the Ottoman Empire; 2. the future monarch may not be 
Muslim, the final decision as to his person is to be taken later; 3. the borders of Albania must 
be justly set, that is, the country cannot lose many important towns (although it remains 
unknown which towns he meant exactly); he however agreed that Ioannina come under the 
control of Greece; 4. guarantees of great powers are necessary, but these cannot overinfluence 
the shaping of the future administration.
111
   
 As Qemali was aware that every important decisions would be made in London, he 
soon left Vienna for Paris and then arrived in the British capital. During his travels he gave 
several interviews and did his best to win the European press to the cause of Albania.
112
 In 
London, the delegation was courteously received. Although the members might have no say 
in the matters discussed at the conference, they could freely get in touch with Grey, minister 
of Foreign Affairs as well as with the representatives of the Triple Alliance. The delegation 
took lodging at Hotel Cecil and enjoyed considerable public attention, partly owing to 
Boletini's presence. The Kosovarian commandant had become rather famous in Europe as the 
"Albanian Robin Hood" and in London he refused to give up his traditional attire, and his 
daggers and revolvers in his belt were an indispensable part of his outfit just like in 
Albania.
113
   
In London however, Qemali radically modified his concepts of domestic politics. Soon 
after he had left Paris he came to know that his greatest opponent, Esat Toptani Pasha had 
surrendered Shkodra and with his army of thousands of troops he had set out for the South. 
For the Premier this arrangement spelled disaster.
114
  
 
The news on the fall of Shkodra on 24
th
 April brought about a radical change in the Albanian 
domestic policy. For the politically active Albanians the surrender of the fort town signified 
not the fall of the last Ottoman fortress in Europe, but the emergence in an already troubled 
domestic political atmosphere of the powerful Esat Toptani Pasha who, considering his 
influence and the capability of intrigue was equalled by Qemali only. In return for Shkodra 
Esat Toptani struck a deal with Montenegro and Serbia: the withdrawing troops could retain 
their weapons and ammunition and the two Slavic countries would support the Pasha’s 
hegemonic aspirations in creating his own principality in Middle-Albania. Esat Toptani and 
his army of 10.000 soldiers set out for the South at the end of April and planned to personally 
adjust the future fate of Albania to his own political ambitions. 
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